How One Engineer’s “ILLEGAL” Idea Created The Ultimate Ship Killer

Early March 1943, Port Morrisby, Papua, New Guinea. The wrench slipped from oil stained hands as Captain Paul Irvvin Gun stared at the modified bomber before him. Inside that aircraft was something that should not exist, something that violated every regulation in the United States Army Air Force’s manual, something his commanding officer had not officially authorized.

Eight forward-firing 50 caliber machine guns protruded from where a bombardier’s glass nose should have been. The B-25 Mitchell medium bomber designed for precision bombing from altitude had been transformed into something entirely different. A ship killer, a commerce destroyer, an illegal experiment that would either save the Pacific theater or earn Gun a court marshal.

What neither Gun nor anyone else knew was that this unauthorized modification, born from desperation and personal fury, would trigger the most devastating defeat the Japanese Navy would suffer in the entire Pacific campaign. The mathematics of Allied victory in the Southwest Pacific were being written not in battle plans approved by Washington, but in welding shops and maintenance hangers by a 43-year-old maverick who was fighting his own private war.

The journey to this moment had begun 2 years earlier on December 8th, 1941, Manila time. Paul Irvin Gun, known to absolutely no one as Papy yet, stood at Nicholls Field watching Japanese bombers methodically destroy the American air forces in the Philippines. As manager of the fledgling Philippine Airlines, he had four Red Beach 18 civilian aircraft under his command.

Within hours, Major General Lewis Breitton would commandeer those aircraft and commission gun as a captain in the Army Airore. What should have been a brief wartime service would become a three-year odyssey of innovation, revenge, and technological revolution. Gun was 42 years old, a former Navy chief petty officer who had served 20 years as an enlisted naval aviator before retiring in December 1939.

He had learned to fly in the 1920s, had served with the legendary Top Hatters Fighter Squadron, and had instructed at Pensacola Naval Air Station. He knew aircraft inside and out, not from textbooks, but from two decades of working on them, flying them, and occasionally crashing them. But on that December morning, technical expertise meant nothing.

Gun had a more immediate problem. His wife, Claraara Louise, called Polly by everyone who knew her, and their four children were in Manila as Japanese forces closed in. His two sons, Paul Junior and Nathan, were teenagers. His daughters, Connie and Julie, were younger. The family lived in Manila while Gun ran the airline, a comfortable expatriate existence that had evaporated overnight.

In the chaotic weeks that followed, Gun flew reconnaissance and transport missions across the disintegrating Philippine defenses. He dodged Japanese fighters, survived being shot down over the jungle, walked out to safety, and immediately climbed into another aircraft. On one mission, he earned a distinguished flying cross by flying an unarmed transport into Batan to deliver medical supplies to besieged American troops, navigating through Japanese controlled airspace with nothing but skill and audacity.

But he could not reach his family. On Christmas Eve 1941, Gun received orders to evacuate key personnel to Australia. He drew all his military pay, borrowed as much money as he could from fellow officers, and prepared to take his family to safety. But the Japanese advance was too swift. His family could not make it to the airfield in time.

Gun had to choose between abandoning them or disobeying orders. He flew to Australia because orders were orders, because the war was bigger than one family, because staying meant death or capture. Within weeks on January 20th, 1942, Polly and the children were rounded up by Japanese forces and taken to the University of Sto.

Tomtomas, converted into an internment camp for enemy civilians. Something broke inside Gun when he learned this news. The man who continued fighting was not the same person who had left Manila. He had left behind his wife and four children in the hands of an enemy known for brutality. Every day they remained in that camp was a day gun could not protect them.

The only thing he could do was end the war faster. If he could not save his family directly, he could destroy every ship, every aircraft, every supply line that kept Japanese forces in the Philippines. This was not official policy. This was vengeance disguised as innovation. When Major General George C. Kenny arrived in Brisbane in late July 1942 to take command of the Allied Air Force’s Southwest Pacific area.

He found a disaster. His predecessor had been relieved. Morale was terrible. Equipment was inadequate. The Japanese controlled the air over New Guinea and were threatening Australia itself. General Douglas MacArthur, theater commander, had no confidence in his air forces and made that opinion abundantly clear. Kenny was 53 years old, a World War I fighter race with two confirmed kills and a silver star.

He had taught at the Airore Tactical School and was known for unconventional thinking. When MacArthur subjected him to an hour-long lecture about the shortcomings of Allied air power, Kenny listened politely and then asked for one thing, authority to send home anyone he considered Deadwood. MacArthur, surprised by the request, agreed.

Within weeks, Kenny had reshuffled his command structure, bringing in aggressive younger officers and creating a forward headquarters in New Guinea. To speed decision-making, he appointed Brigadier General Enis Whitehead as his forward commander, giving him authority to change aircraft assignments based on weather and tactical conditions rather than waiting for orders from Brisbane.

But personnel changes meant nothing without effective weapons. Allied bombing from medium and high altitude was proving catastrophically ineffective against Japanese ships. High altitude bombing gave ships time to maneuver. The B17 flying fortresses were hitting less than 1% of their targets. Japanese convoys were resupplying their garrisons in New Guinea with impunity.

Allied ground forces were dying in the jungle while fresh Japanese troops poured ashore from ships that bombers could not sink. Kenny had been thinking about this problem since 1928 when he was an instructor at the tactical school. He had theorized about skip bombing, releasing bombs at very low altitude so they would skip across the water like stones on a pond, slamming into the sides of ships below the water line where armor was weakest.

The concept was sound. The execution was proving difficult. B17s lacked forward firing armorament. Coming in at mast height meant flying through withering anti-aircraft fire with nothing to suppress the gunners. Then Kenny discovered Paul gun and everything changed. In August 1942, Kenny learned that someone in the third attack group was modifying a 20 Havoc light bombers without authorization.

The modifications were crude but effective. Someone had removed the bombardier from the transparent nose and installed 450 caliber machine guns in his place, all firing forward. The idea was to strafe Japanese positions at extremely low altitude, suppressing ground fire before dropping bombs. Kenny investigated and found Captain Paul Gun working essentially alone, scavenging weapons from wrecked fighters and mounting them in attack aircraft.

Gun had taught himself aircraft modification through trial and error. He had no formal engineering degree, but he understood aircraft structures, weight distribution, and weapons systems from two decades of hands-on experience. Most officers would have court marshaled gun for modifying military aircraft without authorization.

Kenny immediately assigned him to his personal staff as special projects officer and gave him an impossible mission. modify every A20 in the theater for lowaltitude attack and do it immediately. Gun worked 18-hour days. He scred weapons from crashed aircraft, fabricated mounting brackets in makeshift workshops, and personally test flew each modification.

He added four 50 caliber machine guns to the nose of each A20, mounted additional guns along the fuselage, and installed bomb racks for parachute fragmentation bombs. The modified A20S went into combat in September 1942, striking a Japanese airfield at Buuna. The results exceeded all expectations. The Strafer A20s came in at treetop level, guns blazing, suppressing anti-aircraft positions before releasing their bombs.

Japanese defenders, accustomed to high altitude bombers they could see coming for minutes, had no time to react. The attack destroyed dozens of aircraft on the ground and demonstrated that low-level strafing could revolutionize air warfare. Kenny immediately ordered gun to begin work on a similar modification for B-25 Mitchell medium bombers.

The B-25 was larger than the A20, had longer range, carried more bombs, and could mount more forwardfiring weapons. If gun could turn the Mitchell into a gunship, it would become the most effective anti-shipping weapon in the theater. The B-25 Mitchell had been designed in 1939 as a medium alitude level bomber. It was a twin engine aircraft with a wingspan of 67 ft 7 in.

Powered by two right R260 radial engines producing 1,700 horsepower each. Normal arament consisted of six 50 caliber machine guns for defense and 3,000 lb of bombs. It carried a crew of five, pilot, co-pilot, bombardier, radio operator, and gunner. The aircraft was named after General Billy Mitchell, the controversial advocate of air power, who had been court marshaled in 1925 for his outspoken views.

Approximately 9,890 B-25s would eventually be built at two North American aviation plants, one in Englewood, California, and another in Kansas City, Kansas. The B-25 had gained fame in April 1942 when Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle led 16 B-25Bs on a daring raid against Tokyo, launching from the aircraft carrier USS Hornet.

The raid did minimal physical damage, but provided an enormous morale boost to Americans still reeling from Pearl Harbor. Most importantly, it forced Japan to keep fighter aircraft home to defend the mainland rather than sending them to the front lines. But the B-25’s primary role remained medium alitude bombing, a mission at which it was proving ineffective against ships.

Gun looked at the B-25 and saw potential no one else recognized. The aircraft’s nose section was large enough to mount multiple heavy machine guns. The twin engine design provided redundancy. Losing one engine would not doom the aircraft. The sturdy construction could absorb punishment. Most importantly, the Mitchell had enough range to reach Japanese shipping lanes that the shorter range A20 could not.

In late 1942, Gun began modifying B25s in a maintenance hanger at Townsville, Australia. He was working with Captain Jack Fox, the North American aviation technical representative in theater. Fox was supposed to ensure that aircraft modifications followed factory specifications. Instead, he became Gun’s co-conspirator in what would become the most successful unauthorized aircraft modification program of the war.

The first challenge was removing the bombardier and his glass nose section. This saved weight and eliminated a vulnerable position that was useless for lowaltitude attack. Gun replaced the transparent nose with a solid metal nose housing 450 caliber M2 Browning machine guns, all firing forward and operated by the pilot. Each gun had 500 rounds of ammunition.

The rate of fire was approximately 850 rounds per minute per gun, meaning the pilot could unleash a storm of lead that would shred any target in seconds. But four guns were not enough for gun. He added two more 50 caliber guns in cheek blisters on either side of the forward fuselage just below and behind the cockpit.

These package guns extended slightly beyond the propeller ark, allowing them to fire without the bullets passing through the propeller disc. They were fixed, firing forward, adding to the pilot’s firepower. Then gun made a radical decision. The B-25 had a dorsal turret with twin 50 caliber guns mounted behind the cockpit. This turret could rotate to defend against attacks from above and behind.

Gun locked the turret in the forward firing position, adding two more guns to the pilot’s control. The co-pilot could now operate these guns using a sight in the cockpit, or the pilot could fire all weapons simultaneously using a master trigger. Now, the modified B-25 had eight forward-firing 50 caliber machine guns delivering approximately 180 lb of projectiles per second.

For comparison, a single P-51 Mustang fighter carried 650 caliber guns. The modified B-25 had the forward firepower of more than one fighter aircraft concentrated in a platform that also carried 2,000 lb of bombs. The modifications created significant engineering challenges. Adding weight to the nose shifted the aircraft’s center of gravity forward, making it noseheavy and difficult to control.

Gun compensated by repositioning equipment after and ballasting the tail section. The enormous recoil from eight guns firing simultaneously created structural stress. Gun reinforced the nose section with additional bracing. The guns generated tremendous heat and smoke. Gun added ventilation systems and moved ammunition storage to reduce fire risk.

Most critically, gun had to solve the problem of gun harmonization. The eight guns needed to converge their fire at a specific point in front of the aircraft, typically between 200 and 400 yd. If the guns were not properly aligned, bullets would spray everywhere except the target.

Gun developed a ground testing procedure using targets placed at measured distances, adjusting each gun mount until all eight weapons converged precisely. He test fired the guns personally, making minute adjustments, refusing to sign off on any aircraft until it met his standards. The entire modification process took approximately 2 weeks per aircraft when working around the clock.

Gun trained maintenance crews to perform the work, establishing production line techniques. By December 1942, he had modified enough B-25s to equip the 91st Bombardment Squadron. The squadron needed a commander who understood lowaltitude attack and was not afraid to violate conventional bombing doctrine. Kenny selected Major Ed Lana, a pilot who had risen from first left tenant to major in just a few weeks due to his aggressive leadership in combat.

Lana had demonstrated exceptional skill in low-level missions and had earned Kenny’s trust. Lana and Gun developed the tactics that would transform naval warfare. The modified B-25s would approach Japanese ships at extremely low altitude, sometimes as low as 50 ft above the water, flying at maximum speed, approximately 300 mph. At this altitude and speed, they were nearly impossible for ship gunners to track.

The closing speed was too fast for manual aim, and the aircraft were already gone before gunners could adjust. As the B-25s approached, pilots would open fire with all eight forward guns at a range of approximately 1,000 yd, walking the fire into the target ship. The stream of 50 caliber bullets would sweep the decks, killing or suppressing anti-aircraft gunners, destroying gun positions, shredding super structures, and creating chaos.

The purpose was not to sink the ship with gunfire, although the damage could be substantial. The purpose was to silence the ship’s defenses and create terror among the crew. Then came the bombs. At a range of approximately 200 to 400 yd, flying at minimum safe altitude, the pilot would release a bomb with a 4 to 5second delayed fuse.

The bomb would leave the aircraft traveling at 300 mph, strike the water, and skip across the surface. The bomb would bounce once, perhaps twice, then slam into the side of the ship at or below the water line. The delayed fuse ensured the bomb did not explode on impact. Instead, it would penetrate the hull, sink slightly beneath the surface, and then detonate.

The explosion occurred in the most vulnerable part of the ship below the armor belt where hulls were thinnest. The blast was enhanced by the incompressibility of water, which transmitted shock waves with devastating efficiency. A single bomb exploding below the water line could break a ship’s keel, rupture fuel tanks, flood engine rooms, and cause catastrophic structural failure.

By the time the bomb detonated, the B-25 was already past the target, climbing rapidly to avoid the blast and secondary explosions. The entire attack from first gunshots to bomb release took approximately 10 seconds. Skip bombing was not entirely new. The British had experimented with the technique.

Some American pilots had tried it independently. But combining skip bombing with overwhelming forward firepower was guns innovation. The Strafer nose turned the bomber into its own fighter escort, suppressing defenses before dropping bombs. This combination would prove devastating. While gun was modifying aircraft, Allied intelligence was monitoring Japanese naval movements.

Ultra intercepts, the codereing operation that had cracked Japanese naval codes, provided detailed information about enemy plans. Fleet radio unit Melbourne, known as FREL, was reading Japanese messages almost in real time. In late February 1943, Fumel intercepted messages indicating a major Japanese convoy was being assembled at Rabal on the island of New Britain.

The convoy’s destination was lay on the northern coast of New Guinea. The cargo was troops and supplies for Japanese forces fighting Allied advances in Papua. The intelligence was specific. Eight transport ships would carry approximately 6,900 troops of the 51st Division. Eight destroyers would provide escort. The convoy would depart Rebal at midnight on February 28th, 1943 and arrive at Lelay approximately 3 days later.

This was Japan’s maximum effort to reinforce New Guinea. If the convoy succeeded, Japanese forces would be strengthened significantly, potentially stopping Allied advances. If the convoy failed, Japan would lose thousands of experienced troops and likely never attempt another major reinforcement by sea.

General Kenny saw an opportunity to test his modified aircraft and new tactics against the most important target since Pearl Harbor. He assembled every available aircraft in theater for a coordinated attack. The strike force would include B17 flying fortresses bombing from medium altitude, Royal Australian Air Force bow fighters strafing at low level, P38 Lightning fighters providing air cover, and modified B25 strafers executing skip bombing attacks.

It would be the largest coordinated air operation in the Southwest Pacific to date. Kenny personally briefed squadron commanders on February 28th. The orders were explicit. Find the convoy. Attack without mercy. Give no quarter. Sink every ship. This was not a raid. This was annihilation. At midnight on February 28th, 1943, the Japanese convoy departed Simpson Harbor at Rabul.

Rear Admiral Masatami Kimura commanded from the destroyer Shiraayuki. The convoy consisted of eight cargo transports. Kiyoko Maru, Kembaru, Teayom Maru, Nojima, Aayomaru, Ta Maru, Shinimaru and Oawa Maru. Eight destroyers provided escort. Shiraayuki, Asashio, Arashio, Tokitsukazi, Yukazi, Uranami, Shikinami, and Asagumo.

Approximately 100 Japanese Zero fighters would fly air cover during the voyage. The convoy was the strongest force Japan had assembled for a resupply mission. Kimura expected to lose ships. Every previous convoy to New Guinea had suffered losses, but Japanese commanders believed enough ships would survive to deliver the troops. They were wrong.

The convoy was spotted that afternoon by a B-24 Liberator on patrol. The crew radioed the position, course, and composition. Kenny’s command immediately launched reconnaissance aircraft to track the convoy. Weather favored the Japanese initially. Two tropical storms moved through the area, providing cloud cover and reducing visibility.

Allied aircraft maintained contact but could not attack effectively through the storms. The convoy made good progress, moving at 7 knots, approximately 8 mph. The slow speed was dictated by the heavily loaded transports. The destroyers could have made 20 knots or more, but they had to match the convoy’s pace.

By nightfall on March 1st, the Japanese had covered approximately 90 mi. They were roughly halfway to lay. The weather was deteriorating, which Kimura welcomed. Poor weather meant fewer Allied aircraft, but the storms also meant rough seas that pounded the transports. Troops below decks suffered terribly from seasickness in the crowded holds.

On the morning of March 2nd, 1943, the weather improved slightly. Allied reconnaissance aircraft regained visual contact. At approximately 10:00 in the morning, 29 B7 flying fortresses attacked from 5,000 ft. The high altitude bombing was predictably ineffective. The B7s claimed hits, but Japanese records indicate minimal damage.

One transport may have been damaged slightly. The attack served one purpose. It forced the convoy to alter course repeatedly, slowing progress toward Lei. Throughout March 2nd, additional B17 strikes continued. The flying fortresses dropped dozens of bombs from various altitudes. Ships maneuvered frantically, and Japanese fighters engaged the bombers. Several B7s were damaged.

Three Japanese fighters were shot down, but no ships sank. The high altitude attacks were harassing the convoy, not stopping it. As night fell on March 2nd, Kenny knew the critical attack would come the next morning. The modified B-25s were ready. Major Lana had briefed his pilots repeatedly.

They had rehearsed the attack profile on a wrecked ship on February 28th using combined formations of B7, B-25, P38, and bow fighters. Every pilot understood the mission. The skip bombing technique had been practiced. The strafer guns had been harmonized. The ordinance had been loaded. The point of no return was approaching.

At dawn on March 3rd, 1943, weather conditions were perfect for an air attack. Clear skies, good visibility, calm seas. Rear Admiral Kimura must have felt a chill of premonition. His convoy was approximately 30 mi from Lei, close enough that land-based anti-aircraft guns could provide some support, but still vulnerable to air attack.

The Allied strike force assembled at Cape Ward Hunt on the northern coast of Papua. Approximately 90 Allied aircraft converged on the Japanese convoy, including B17 Flying fortresses, modified B-25 Strafers, Royal Australian Air Force bow fighters, and P38 Lightning fighters for escort. Multiple waves would attack from different directions throughout the day.

The attack began at approximately 10 in the morning. The B17 strikes struck first from medium altitude, diverting attention and forcing ships to maneuver. Then the lowaltitude aircraft arrived. Bow fighters came in first, strafing with four 20 mm cannons and six machine guns, suppressing anti-aircraft fire. The destroyers opened up with everything they had, but the closing speed was too fast.

Then the modified B-25 strafers arrived and the slaughter began. Modified B25 Strafers participated in multiple attack waves throughout the morning. One pilot selected the transport Kyokus Maru as his target and pushed the nose down to 50 ft above the water. At 1,000 yd, he opened fire. 850 caliber machine guns, 6,800 rounds per minute combined rate of fire, 180 pounds of projectiles per second, ripped into the transport.

Tracers showed where the bullets were going. The fire walked from the bow toward the superructure, shredding everything. Sailors were cut down where they stood. Anti-aircraft guns were blown apart. The bridge disintegrated under the impacts. Metal fragments flew everywhere. Then he released his bombs. Two 500-lb generalurpose bombs with delayed fuses dropped away.

They hit the water 200 yd from the ship, skipped once, and slammed into the hull just below the waterline amid ships. The pilot pulled up and banked away. Behind him, the bombs detonated. Two massive underwater explosions ripped the bottom out of Kyokus Maru. The transport lurched violently. Water poured into the engine room and holds.

The ship began settling immediately, listing to port. It would sink within 15 minutes. Other modified B-25s followed in successive waves. Each selected a target. Each executed the same devastating attack profile. Guns blazing, bombs skipping, ships exploding. The transport Kembaru took multiple hits. At least three B-25s attacked it.

The combined gunfire killed most of the crew above decks. Four bombs struck below the water line. The ship broke in half and sank in less than 10 minutes. Teayom Maru was strafed so heavily that fires broke out across the superructure. Two bombs opened the hull. The transport went down with nearly 1,000 troops still aboard.

Noima tried to maneuver but was too slow. A B25 Strafer rad it from stern to bow, then put two bombs into the engine room. The ship lost power and began taking on water. It would sink later in the day. The bow fighters and remaining B-25s attacked the destroyers. The destroyer Shiraayuki, Admiral Kimura’s flagship, was hit by strafing fire that killed almost everyone on the bridge, including Kimura, who was wounded.

A bomb struck near the stern, starting a magazine fire. Secondary explosions blew the stern section off. The destroyer sank. Tokitsu Kaz took direct bomb hits that ignited fuel tanks. The destroyer became a floating inferno and sank within the hour. Arashio collided with the transport Nojima while maneuvering and suffered heavy damage.

The destroyer was abandoned and sank. Throughout the attack, Japanese Zero fighters tried desperately to protect the convoy. But the P38 Lightnings engaged them at high altitude while the B-25s operated at mast head height where fighters could not safely attack without hitting their own ships. The coordination was perfect.

The attack lasted approximately 40 minutes. When the Allied aircraft withdrew to rearm and refuel, the scene was apocalyptic. Four transports were sinking or already sunk. Three destroyers were gone. The remaining ships were scattered, some damaged, all in chaos. Hundreds of Japanese soldiers and sailors were in the water.

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Bodies floated among the wreckage. Oil slicks burned. That afternoon, Allied aircraft returned for additional strikes. Modified B-25s found the surviving ships limping toward Lei. The attacks were methodical and merciless. Each ship was targeted individually. The Strafa B-25s came in low, guns blazing, bombs skipping. More transports sank.

The destroyer Asashio, already damaged, took more bombs and went under. By nightfall on March 3rd, all eight transports and four of the eight destroyers had been sunk. Approximately 3,000 Japanese soldiers and sailors were dead or drowning. Another 2,700 would be rescued by the four surviving destroyers and by submarines sent from Rabol.

Only about 1,200 troops would eventually reach Lei, many without weapons or equipment. Of the 6,900 troops originally embarked, more than 5,700 were casualties. The convoy had been annihilated. Allied losses were remarkably light. One B17 Flying fortress was shot down. Three P-38 fighters were lost in combat. 13 air crew were killed.

Compared to the Japanese losses, it was barely a skirmish. The Battle of the Bismar Sea, as it came to be known, represented a turning point in the Pacific War. It demonstrated conclusively that land-based aircraft could destroy a heavily escorted naval convoy. It proved the effectiveness of skip bombing when combined with overwhelming forward firepower.

It validated every modification gun had made to the B-25. Most importantly, it convinced Japan that resupplying garrisons by sea in the Southwest Pacific was no longer feasible. Never again would Japan attempt a major convoy to New Guinea. Japanese forces there would slowly starve and wither as supplies dwindled.

General MacArthur issued a communique claiming 22 ships sunk, including three cruisers and seven destroyers, and over 12,000 troops killed. The actual numbers were lower, but still devastating. The exaggerations were typical of wartime propaganda. What mattered was the strategic impact.

Kenny had proven his concepts worked. Skip bombing was viable. Modified bombers were effective. Lowaltitude attacks could succeed despite heavy defenses. Paul Gun, watching from Australia as reports came in, must have felt grim satisfaction. His modifications had destroyed a Japanese convoy. His aircraft had killed thousands of enemy troops.

But his family was still in Sto. Thomas, and the war was far from over. The success of the battle of Bismar Sea led to immediate expansion of the modification program. Kenny ordered all available B-25s in theater converted to strafer configuration. Gun worked even harder, training additional crews, refining techniques, increasing production.

By mid 1943, most B-25s in the Southwest Pacific had been modified. North American Aviation, the manufacturer, took notice. Company representatives visited guns workshops, examined the modifications, and requested detailed specifications. The company wanted to incorporate guns innovations into factory production.

Gun was promoted to major and sent back to the United States to work with North American Aviation at their Englewood and Kansas City plants. He spent several months in 1943 and early 1944 working with engineers to design factory-produced strafer versions of the B-25. The result was the B-25G which mounted a 75 mm cannon in the nose along with four 50 caliber machine guns.

405 B-25gs were built. The 75 mm cannon fired a 14.7lb shell that could penetrate ship armor or destroy bunkers. But the cannon was difficult to load, required a crew member in the nose, and had a slow rate of fire. Gun personally tested the B-25G in combat, leading a raid with the third attack group against a Japanese destroyer.

He hit the fire control system with the 75 mm cannon, disabling the destroyer’s ability to coordinate its guns. The ship was then sunk by conventional bombs. Gun insisted publicly that he had sunk the destroyer with the cannon, but privately admitted it was the bombs that finished the job. The B-25H followed the G model into production.

1,00 B25H’s were built with the 75 mm cannon and 1450 caliber machine guns arranged in various positions. The H model relocated the dorsal turret forward and eliminated the co-pilot position to save weight with the navigator handling cannon loading. The massive firepower came at a cost. The B-25H was noseheavy and difficult to control.

Right Field, the Army Air Force’s development center, sent Gun a message stating the modification was dangerous and aircraft should be grounded until the center of gravity issue was resolved. Legend has it, Gun replied, put center of gravity in storage for the duration. We have a war to fight. The story may be apocryphal, but it captured Gun’s attitude perfectly.

Technical perfection mattered less than combat effectiveness. The pilots learned to compensate for the handling issues. The final production variant, the B-25J, reverted to a conventional bombardier nose on some aircraft while retaining the strafer nose on others. 4,318 B-25Js were built, making it the most numerous variant. Some B-25s JS were equipped with eight forward-firing guns in the nose, four guns in cheek blisters, two guns in the dorsal turret, and four guns in waist positions.

Total armorament could reach 1850 caliber machine guns, the most heavily armed bomber of World War II. The firepower was unnecessary in most situations, but it intimidated enemy forces psychologically. Japanese troops learned to fear the sound of Mitchell engines. The distinctive roar meant death was incoming. Throughout 1943 and 1944, modified B25s devastated Japanese targets across the Pacific.

In August 1943, B25 strafers attacked Japanese airfields at Wiiwac in New Guinea. The raids destroyed 174 aircraft on the ground, breaking the back of Japanese air power in the region. The Wiiwac raids were possible because Gun had solved another problem, range. B25s had sufficient range for most missions, but Wewac was at the limit.

Gun developed a technique using auxiliary fuel tanks carried in the bomb bay. Once the fuel was consumed, the tanks were jettisoned through an open hole in the floor. The system was crude with fuel fumes permeating the fuselage and a breeze blowing through the aircraft, but it extended range by several hundred miles. The Wiiwac raids ended Japanese air superiority over New Guinea and allowed Allied ground forces to advance with minimal air opposition.

In November 1943, B25 Strafers attacked Rabol Harbor in one of the war’s most spectacular raids. Major Raymond Jock Henterbury led 38 B-25s against shipping in the heavily defended harbor. The attack occurred at Mastad height with P38s providing top cover and phosphorous bombs creating smoke screens.

Of 38 vessels in the harbor, 30 received direct hits. One heavy cruiser, three destroyers, and numerous transports and support ships were sunk or damaged. The raid paralyzed Rabul as a forward base and demonstrated that even the strongest Japanese positions were vulnerable to modified B-25s. In the Philippines campaign of 1944, B-25 strafers provided closeair support for ground forces, destroyed Japanese supply lines, and attacked shipping throughout the archipelago.

The aircraft became known as the bat out of hell because attacks came so fast and low that defenders had no time to react. Guns modified B-25s were not the only weapons winning the Pacific War, but they were among the most effective. They destroyed hundreds of ships, thousands of aircraft on the ground, and killed tens of thousands of enemy troops.

They enabled MacArthur’s island hopping strategy by isolating Japanese garrisons from resupply. They gave Allied forces air superiority that made amphibious landings possible. Guns personal war continued throughout this period. His family remained imprisoned at Stomas. Letters occasionally reached him through the Red Cross, but communication was sporadic and censored.

He knew conditions in the camp were deteriorating. Japanese guards became harsher as the war turned against them. Food became scarce. disease spread. Gun could do nothing except fight harder, hoping each mission brought the wars end closer. In late 1944, American forces invaded Lee in the Philippines.

Gun was there, still flying combat missions at age 45, still looking for ways to destroy the enemy more efficiently. On a night in late 1944, Japanese bombers attacked Tacklaban airfield on Lee. Gun was on the ground when white phosphorous bombs exploded nearby. Fragments tore into his shoulder, causing massive damage.

The wound was severe, rendering his right arm useless and causing excruciating pain. He was evacuated to Australia for treatment and would spend months in recovery. The wound ended guns combat flying, but his war was almost over anyway. On February 3rd, 1945, elements of the First Cavalry Division, forming a flying column, liberated Sto.

Thomas Internment Camp in Manila. The cavalry arrived just as Japanese guards were preparing to execute the camp’s leadership. In the chaos of Manila’s street fighting, American soldiers freed over 4,000 internes. Among them were Polygon and her four children. They had survived 3 years and 14 days of internment.

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The family was emaciated, traumatized, but alive. General MacArthur personally visited the camp shortly after liberation and met the gun family. He arranged for them to be flown to Australia to reunite with Papy Gun. The reunion occurred weeks after liberation. The man who had left Manila on Christmas Eve 1941 finally held his family again.

Polly had kept the children together through impossible circumstances. The boys, now young men, had survived the separation of male and female quarters. The girls had endured years of deprivation. They were together again, but they were different people than they had been. The war had changed them all. Gun remained in the Army Air Forces after recovering from his wounds.

He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and continued working on aircraft modifications and tactical development, though no longer flying combat. He retired from military service on June 30th, 1948 as a full colonel, medically retired due to his injuries. His decorations included the distinguished flying cross with one oakleaf cluster indicating a second award, the silver star, the legion of merit, the air medal, nine purple hearts, and numerous unit citations and campaign ribbons.

Nine purple hearts represented nine separate occasions on which he was wounded or injured in combat. Gun returned to the Philippines and reestablished Philippine Airlines. The country was rebuilding from years of occupation and the destruction of liberation. Gun helped restore air transportation, reconnecting islands that had been isolated.

He was still flying, still taking risks, still pushing limits. On October 11th, 1957, 7 days before his 58th birthday, Gun was flying a charter flight when his aircraft encountered a severe storm. The plane crashed. Paul Irvin Papy Gun died doing what he had done for nearly 40 years, flying. He was buried at Barancus National Cemetery at Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida, where he had once been an instructor.

His legacy lived in multiple forms. The B-25 Strafer modifications he pioneered remained standard throughout the war. Approximately 9,890 B-25 Mitchells were built and thousands were configured as strafers based on guns designs. The skip bombing technique he helped perfect destroyed hundreds of Japanese ships and contributed significantly to Allied victory in the Pacific.

Gun demonstrated that innovation could come from anywhere, even from modifications made by a grieving father in a maintenance hanger. The official military bureaucracy wanted to fight World War II with existing weapons and approved tactics. Gun showed that desperate circumstances required desperate innovations. The Battle of the Bismar Sea became a case study in militarymies worldwide.

The combination of intelligence, coordination, new weapons, and new tactics achieved a complete victory at minimal cost. It demonstrated what air power could accomplish against naval forces when properly employed. Eight transports destroyed, four destroyers sunk, over 5,000 casualties, all for the loss of four allied aircraft.

The mathematics were simple and brutal. You could not survive in an environment where the enemy controlled the air. Every ship sunk in the Bismar Sea represented dozens of missions that would never be flown. Hundreds of troops who would never fight, thousands of rounds of ammunition that would never be fired.

Destroying supplies before they reached the battlefield was the most efficient form of warfare. The modified B-25 became the weapon system that made this possible. It could range hundreds of miles to find ships, suppress their defenses with overwhelming firepower, destroy them with skip bombing attacks, and returned to base for another mission.

One B25 Strafer could accomplish what previously required coordinated attacks by multiple aircraft types. Japan learned the lesson too late. After the Bismar Sea disaster, Japanese commanders knew they could no longer move large convoys in daylight within range of Allied air bases. They switched to nighttime movements, used submarines for critical supplies, and increasingly relied on barge traffic that could hide in coastal waters during the day.

These measures reduced but did not eliminate losses. B25 strafers hunted barges with the same efficiency they hunted ships. Night-flying B25s equipped with radar found convoys in darkness. There was no safe time, no safe method, no safe place for Japanese logistics in the Southwest Pacific. The strangle hold tightened month by month until Japanese garrisons were effectively isolated.

In New Guinea, in the Philippines, throughout the Pacific Islands, Japanese troops fought on with dwindling supplies and no hope of reinforcement. They were brave, tenacious, and doomed. Air superiority achieved by weapons like the modified B-25 made their courage irrelevant. By 1945, the modified B-25 had become the standard anti-shipping weapon in the Pacific.

The aircraft evolved with the B-25GH, and J variants incorporating increasingly heavy armorament, but the basic concept remained gun’s original innovation. a medium bomber converted into a flying gun platform that could suppress defenses and deliver devastating attacks at minimum altitude. When the war ended in August 1945, modified B-25s were still flying combat missions.

They were among the aircraft that escorted the Japanese surrender delegation from Japan to Manila in mid August. It was fitting that the aircraft that had done so much to defeat Japan would witness its surrender. Postwar analysis by both American and Japanese historians confirmed the significance of guns innovations. Japanese naval officers stated that after the Battle of the Bismar Sea, they knew they could not safely operate in waters within range of Allied air bases.

The psychological impact was as important as the physical destruction. Convoy commanders knew that low-flying bombers could appear without warning and destroy entire formations before defenses could respond. Modified B-25s had created a new type of warfare where medium bombers hunted ships with the efficiency of submarines and the firepower of cruisers.

The implications extended beyond the Pacific War. Postwar air forces worldwide studied the lessons of skip bombing and forwardfiring arament. The concept of the gunship, an aircraft designed primarily for gun attack rather than bombing, became standard in many air forces. The AC-47, AC19, and AC30 gunships used in Vietnam and subsequent conflicts were conceptual descendants of guns modified B-25s.

Of the 9,890 B-25s built during World War II, over 100 survive today, most in the United States. Many are maintained in flying condition, appearing at air shows where crowds marvel at their size, sound, and history. The distinctive roar of Wright R260 engines is unforgettable. The sight of a B-25 banking low over an airfield as they did over Japanese ships reminds observers of what these aircraft accomplished.

Several flying B-25s are configured as strafers with forward firing guns in the nose. When these guns are fired during demonstrations using blank ammunition, the sound is overwhelming. The muzzle blast is visible. The aircraft shuddters from the recoil. Watching a B-25 Strafer demonstration gives viewers a glimpse of what Japanese sailors experienced in the final seconds before their ships were destroyed.

Museums worldwide display B-25s in various configurations. The National Museum of the United States Air Force in Dayton, Ohio has multiple examples. The National Naval Aviation Museum in Pensacola, Florida, where gun once instructed displays a B25. The Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum preserves the history.

Each aircraft tells the story of innovation, desperation, and victory. In 1959, General George Kenny published the saga of Papy Gun, a biography of the man whose innovations had changed the war. Kenny, by then retired, wanted to ensure guns contributions were not forgotten. The book detailed Gun’s modifications, his combat missions, and his personal war to free his family.

Kenny wrote that Gun was one of the most important individuals in the Pacific War, a man whose unauthorized actions had saved thousands of Allied lives and shortened the war. Nathaniel Gun, Papy’s youngest son, also wrote about his father’s story. His books provided the family perspective describing life in Santa Thomas and the long wait for liberation.

The gun family story became an example of the human cost of war and the strength required to endure. In 1975, the United States Air Force honored Gun postumously by naming a training facility after him. The recognition was overdue but heartfelt. Gun had never sought glory. He had sought effectiveness. The story of how one engineer’s unauthorized modifications created a devastating weapon system remains relevant.

Gun refused to accept his family’s imprisonment as inevitable. He refused to accept that existing weapons were adequate. He refused to accept regulations that prevented innovation. That refusal, combined with technical skill and Kenny’s support, produced modifications that changed warfare. The B-25 Strafer destroyed hundreds of Japanese ships, killed thousands of enemy troops, and contributed significantly to Allied victory in the Pacific.

Innovation can come from unexpected sources and succeed through unorthodox methods. The modified B-25 was not the weapon that won World War II. That victory required contributions from millions of people using thousands of weapons over four years of global conflict. But the modified B-25 achieved effects disproportionate to its numbers.

The aircraft represented what was possible when necessity met opportunity, when personal motivation aligned with military requirements, when one man decided that failure was unacceptable. The weapon was born in a maintenance hanger from desperation. It flew into combat at mast head height, guns blazing, bombs skipping across water to slam into hulls and explode below the waterline.

It destroyed Japanese hopes of resupplying their forces. It shortened the war. It saved allied lives and it freed one family from three years of imprisonment which was the point all along.